ASTRALIS SYS
TRL 3 · VALIDATED/--:--:-- UTC

BUILDING RESILIENT POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING SYSTEMS

SECURING THE
TRUST LAYEROF GLOBAL PNT INFRASTRUCTURE

Angulus is a physical-layer intelligence platform that verifies position, navigation and timing — and actively defends it — before any receiver is compromised.

DISCOVER ANGULUS THE DEPENDENCY MAP
BUILT BY RESEARCHERS · ASTROPHYSICISTS · AI ENGINEERS SELECTED FOR ESA BIC PADUA
POSITION · NAVIGATION · TIMING — VERIFIED AT THE PHYSICAL LAYER ASTRALIS SYS — TECHNICAL BRIEFING FIG. 00 · ORBITAL TRAFFIC — 3D PADOVA · ITALY STATUS · TRL 3 → TRL 5

01 / THE DEPENDENCY MAP

ONE SIGNAL.
EVERY CRITICAL SYSTEM.

FIG. 01 · 8 CLASSES
HOVER TO INTERROGATE

Eight classes of critical infrastructure — every one of them trusting the same faint signal from orbit, and none of them able to check it. Select a node to see what it depends on.

GROUND STATION FOLLOWS GNSS POSITION & TIME TELECOM NETWORKS SYNCS CELLS TO GNSS CLOCKS DATA CENTRE LOGS DEPEND ON GNSS TIME FINANCE TRADES TIMESTAMPED TO µS PORTS AGVS POSITION VIA GNSS MARITIME NAVIGATES BY SATELLITE AVIATION APPROACHES ARE GNSS-GUIDED AUTONOMOUS TRUSTS GNSS · NO HUMAN LOOP GNSS · GPS / GALILEO WEAKER THAN BACKGROUND NOISE RECORD-AND-REPLAY SPOOF NO SIGNATURE CAN STOP IT ANGULUS · DETECTION UNDER 1.2 S · MEASURED FIG. 01 — WHO TRUSTS GNSS · 8 STAKEHOLDER CLASSES (ILLUSTRATIVE) GROUND STATION GNSS POSITION & TIME TELECOM NETWORKS CELLS SYNC TO GNSS DATA CENTRE LOGS DEPEND ON GNSS FINANCE TRADES TO µS PORTS AGVS VIA GNSS MARITIME NAVIGATES BY SATELLITE AVIATION GNSS-GUIDED APPROACH AUTONOMOUS NO HUMAN IN LOOP FIG. 01 — WHO TRUSTS GNSS (ILLUSTRATIVE)

AUTO-CYCLING · HOVER OR TAP A NODE TO PIN IT

02 / WHO WE ARE

THE THREAT IS PHYSICAL. SO IS THE DEFENCE.

PRODUCT · ANGULUS
ESA BIC PADUA

Astralis Sys builds resilient positioning, navigation and timing systems. Our product is Angulus — a physical-layer intelligence platform for the GNSS threat.

We are selected for ESA BIC Padua — the European Space Agency's business incubation centre in Padua — and we are building the trust layer of global PNT infrastructure: the continuous verification that critical systems currently lack.

"To secure and build resilient systems for position, navigation and timing across 6G networks."

03 / OUR PEOPLE

BUILT BY RESEARCHERS, ASTROPHYSICISTS AND AI ENGINEERS

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM
PADOVA · ITALY

A team whose heritage runs from ESA programme research to production AI shipped in real deployment environments.

Researchers

RIGOUR

A research-grade culture: every performance claim is designed to be independently verifiable — benchmarked before it is ever stated.

Astrophysicists

HERITAGE

Deep roots in astrophysics and space science, including ESA programme research — fields where results have to survive scrutiny.

AI Engineers

PRODUCTION

Production AI experience — systems shipped across real deployment environments, not just the lab.

04 / THE PROBLEM

CRITICAL SYSTEMS TRUST GNSS WITHOUT CHECKING IT

GNSS · GPS · GALILEO
A SIGNAL BELOW THE NOISE

TELECOM NETWORKS

5G/6G cells synchronise to GNSS-disciplined clocks.

DATA CENTRES AND FINANCE

Timestamps and logs depend on GNSS time.

GROUND STATIONS AND MARITIME

Operations follow GNSS position and time.

ESPECIALLY EXPOSED

Network timing: one spoofed GNSS feed can corrupt timing across many cells at once.

Receivers cannot tell a fake signal from a real one.

The answer to both trust questions is the same: GNSS — GPS, Galileo. A signal weaker than background noise. Message-level authentication like Galileo OSNMA exists — but it is bypassed entirely by record-and-replay spoofing, a physical-layer attack that no cryptographic signature can stop.

THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

0+Spoofing & jamming incidents logged in 2024
700–1,350Commercial flights affected every single day
0%Increase in cockpit GPS signal-loss events, 2021–2024 (IATA)
The threat is not theoretical. It is happening now, at scale.

DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS

JUN 2026

Continental-scale GPS, Galileo & BeiDou outages from Iceland to Italy traced to three Russian EKS satellites — the first confirmed GNSS jamming from space. (UT Austin · Stanford · GMV)

APR 2024

117 vessels simultaneously displaced to Beirut Airport — live navigation showing airport coordinates while at sea.

JUN 2025

3,000+ vessels disrupted across the Persian Gulf & Strait of Hormuz — the largest single spoofing event on record. (Windward AI)

2021–24

Air France commits to a multi-year, multi-million-euro fleet retrofit after sustained cockpit GPS anomalies.

SO HOW DO YOU KNOW IF YOUR TIMING OR POSITION HAS ALREADY BEEN COMPROMISED?

SolutionDetection methodLatencyOutput
RAIM / ARAIMPost-correlation receiver monitoring4–6 sBinary alert
Safran / OroliaBroadShield · SecureSyncPost-correlation hardware appliance4–6 sBinary alert
EGNOS / WAASWide-area atmospheric augmentationNot real-timeNo per-site integrity state
Septentrio AIM+u-blox firmwareReceiver-locked post-correlation4–6 sBinary alert

Every deployed system acts after the receiver is already compromised.

None produce a continuous, confidence-qualified output.

None satisfy DORA, NIS2, or EASA SIB 2022-02R3.

T = 0 T = 1.2 S T = 4–6 S Attack begins Angulus detects Incumbent alert fires
DANGER ZONE — COMPROMISED PNT ENTERING OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS UNDETECTED

FINANCE

A platform timestamps thousands of trades against a spoofed clock.

MiFID II breach — silently broken

MARITIME

A vessel drifts off course before any bridge alarm fires.

Liability exposure — no evidence trail

PORTS

Automated cranes & AGVs mis-position cargo against a false fix.

Terminal halt — cascading throughput loss

AVIATION

A GNSS approach is guided onto coordinates that no longer exist.

EASA SIB 2022-02R3 — safety-critical

DATA CENTRE

Corrupted timing propagates through transaction logs.

DORA Art. 17 — irreversible

TELECOM

One event desyncs every 5G base station in range — ns drifts to µs.

Handovers corrupt network-wide

AUTONOMOUS · AV & DRONES

A vehicle or UAV trusts a spoofed position with no human in the loop.

Physical safety — no fallback authority

REGULATORY EXPOSURE

DORA fines reach 2% of global annual turnover. DORA, NIS2 & EASA SIB 2022-02R3 mandate continuous, verifiable timing integrity.

No deployed product delivers it

05 / INTRODUCING ANGULUS

A PHYSICAL-LAYER INTELLIGENCE PLATFORM

PRODUCT · ANGULUS
TRL 3 → TRL 5

The hardware to survive an attack — atomic clocks, antenna arrays — already exists on the market. What the ecosystem lacks is the intelligence to orchestrate it. Angulus is that intelligence — the trust layer that verifies position, navigation and timing, and defends it, before any receiver is compromised.

WHAT ANGULUS DELIVERS

GNSS threats are caught before any receiver on site is compromised. Measured, hardware-in-loop: under 1.2 seconds from attack to alarm.
< 1.2 S · MEASUREDHARDWARE-IN-LOOPBEFORE THE RECEIVER
A continuous Timing Trust Bound — a living confidence score, not a binary alarm. Integrity becomes something you watch, not something you find out about.
CONTINUOUSCONFIDENCE-QUALIFIEDNOT A BINARY ALARM
Evidence for DORA, NIS2 and EASA SIB 2022-02R3 — cryptographically signed and built in, so compliance is a by-product of operation, not a project.
DORANIS2EASA SIB 2022-02R3
Operations continue on trusted time and position through an attack — zero operator intervention.
PNT MAINTAINEDZERO OPERATOR INTERVENTION
Angulus is not a faster alarm. It is a different layer of physics — and the only one that closes the regulatory gap end to end.

06 / RESULTS

PROPER RESULTS. MEASURED.

RECORDED BENCHMARK DATA
TEXBAT · OAKBAT

<0 SDetection latency — measured hardware-in-loop
0/0Cross-dataset AUC on benchmark spoofing data
TRL 0Validated — working system
0/0Scenarios above 0.9 AUC — TEXBAT & OAKBAT

THE EVIDENCE

FIG. 02 — BENCHMARK AUC · SHUFFLE-CONTROLLED

0.01.0 0.5 0.9
ANGULUS — CROSS-DATASET AUC 0.96 / 0.92 AUC > 0.9 — ALL 8 SCENARIOS SHUFFLE CONTROL ≈ 0.5 — NOT AN ARTEFACT

All results come from recorded datasets. Operational metrics — false-alarm rate, time-to-alarm, performance against power-matched attacks — follow at TRL 4, on real hardware.

TECHNOLOGY READINESS

123 ● NOW45 ◎ TARGET6789
WHERE WE AREESA BIC PADUA — SELECTED

PROTOTYPE — A THREE-NODE EDGE DEPLOYMENT ON AN O-RAN TESTBED.

TRACTION — TECHNICAL PROOF · COMMERCIAL MOMENTUM · REGULATORY TAILWIND

TECHNICAL

  • TRL 3 validated — end-to-end pipeline operational
  • AUC > 0.9 across TEXBAT & OakBat datasets
  • TTD < 1.2 s measured latency

COMMERCIAL

  • Scoping: Horizon Geosciences / Boskalis
  • UAE onshore simulator pilot in discussion
  • Three operator pain points validated
  • Scoping: Qascom — OEM licensing
  • LOI expected within a month of BIC submission

INSTITUTIONAL

  • ESA BIC Padua — selected, hardware-in-loop testing
  • EPO provisional patent filing — Months 1–3

REGULATORY TAILWIND

  • DORA in force Jan 2025 — mandatory spend
  • NIS2 in force Oct 2024
  • EASA SIB 2022-02R3 — aviation resilience obligations
  • No deployed product satisfies any of these
  • First mover captures the compliance reference relationship

07 / ROADMAP

WHERE THIS IS GOING

EACH GATE EARNS
THE RIGHT TO THE NEXT

M1 · MONTH 5

Data schema and hardware

M2 · MONTH 10

Edge prototype

M3 · MONTH 16

On-network deployment — the TRL 5 gate

NOW

VALIDATED DETECTION

  • TRL 3 validated — working system, measured results
  • Detection in under 1.2 seconds
  • Continuous, confidence-qualified output — signed evidence built in
  • Runs alongside existing network infrastructure — zero new central hardware
2027

NETWORK INTEGRATION · 3GPP R19–21

  • Deeper integration into the 5G/6G network layer
  • Joining the O-RAN and AI-RAN Alliance
  • Contributing field evidence to 3GPP PNT working groups
2029+

6G NATIVE · ITU-R IMT-2030

  • Trusted PNT as a native 6G network capability
  • Continuous integrity assurance at every radio unit
  • Sub-microsecond timing resilience
  • Fleet-wide, infrastructure-wide — not site by site

"Make trusted positioning and timing a native capability of 6G within the O-RAN and AI-RAN — the way GPS became native to everything else."

08 / VALIDATE WITH US

HOW WE COULD VALIDATE ANGULUS TOGETHER

TRL 4 · TRL 5
LAB → FIELD

We would value your view on which of these, if any, makes sense for your group.

TRL 4 · IN THE LAB

Lab tests with your signal generators

  • Scenarios we define together, including matched power
  • Independent benchmarking against classical monitors
TRL 5 · RELEVANT ENVIRONMENT

Live-sky recordings and field campaigns

  • Access to licensed open-air test events
  • Validation on a live timing or 5G testbed
WHAT MAKES IT HAPPEN

Funding and review

  • Joint NAVISP or Horizon proposals to fund the tests
  • Expert review of our validation report
  • Joint publication of results

WE WOULD VALUE YOUR CRITIQUE

  • 01Where do you see the biggest weakness in our approach?
  • 02What would an ideal validation setup look like?
  • 03Are there upcoming funding calls where we could work together?
  • 04Who else should we be talking to?

09 / CONTACT

LET'S AGREE ONE CONCRETE NEXT STEP

PADOVA · ITALY
EVERY MESSAGE IS READ

Pick a next step above and transmit — or write your own.

CONTACTASTRALIS SYS
LOCATIONPADOVA · ITALY
INCUBATIONSELECTED FOR ESA BIC PADUA
STATUSTRL 3 → TRL 5